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Exergue
What follows is an attempt at a magmatic representation, reworking and 
reforming some of Cornelius Castoriadis’s ideas relating to the notion of 
political intervention.
The notion of magma – or rather of magmas – is central in Castoriadis’s 
conception of how, and of what, our world is. In a condensed passage in a 
seminal essay, –“The logic of magmas”–, he formulates some ontological theses, 
which I find quite useful as an introduction to his stance. What is, is not totality 
or systems of totalities. What is, is not completely determined. What is, he says, 
“is Chaos, or Abyss, or Without-Foundation. What is, is Chaos stratified in a 
non regular manner.”1 Briefly put, what is, is magmas – some dense, slow and 
sluggish, others liquid, fast and brief as water; all in constant motion, interacting, 
folding into each other just to disengage again; no magma being reducible to 
another, but all relating and leaning upon each other. One magma may include 
other magmas – and be included in others, as for example the multitude of 
sensemaking included in the magma of social imaginary significations.
A magmatic representation of this kind of thought has – in order not to 
betray its content through the use of a contradictory form – to be magmamorph 
in itself. Hence, I will let my own voice, text and pictures fold in and out of 
Castoriadis’s words and thoughts, employing a somewhat formal way of 
presentation, mimicking Castoriadis’s own text. 
It goes without saying that the theses may be read separately, together, in 
and out of order.
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Elucidation: Making the claim that if we humans have any historical and social ‘being’, 
then it is best described through the metaphor ‘being downstream’, I once wrote: “There are, 
of course, several different senses in which being downstream can be understood in 
connection with history and time. Most evidently, perhaps, the notion of downstream 
evokes a river that flows from a perhaps unknown source or origin towards its goal (the sea) 
– in this respect, the metaphor tends to guide our thinking about history, about our being 
in time and in history, towards a conception where time flows, irrevocably, independently, 
not heeding our human needs and preoccupations, following a pre-established direction, 
where we, as it were, are more or less reluctantly washed away with the flow. Ever since 
Heraclitus2 this image has been an integral part of Western thinking, ceaselessly subjected 
to different interpretations, but none the less always implying that change, time and 
therefore history has a direction whether we like it or not. We may succeed in building some 
barriers and, for a time, be able to divert the current from its main course, but in the end 
the flow of time will carry us all away towards whatever end or telos it itself is 
approaching.
Moreover, the image being downstream in history or time evokes a difference in level: 
What has happened before is upstream; what is to come, what will come to pass, is even 
further downstream and we are all familiar with how differences in elevation tend to 
transform themselves into differences in value: the metaphor might seem to imply that 
everything was better before the present, and will be worse in the future – the water used to 
be clearer and fresher; after us, it will be even more polluted. In this sense the notion of 
being downstream is a nostalgic one – expressing a longing for times past and shores long 
passed, and urging us to look for the faraway source or origin whence it all sprang forth.
 But the value-transformation may work in the opposite direction as well. The trickle, 
coming from a small source lost in the high, barren wastelands of unfriendly mountains, 
gains strength, flows more easily, grows mighty and strong as it reaches the valleys and 
becomes a majestic river in the flatlands, where it unhesitatingly chooses the easiest course 
towards its goal – the sea, farther away still. If you interpret the metaphor in this way, what 
Magma – not system, history or 
tradition – is the appropriate term 
to use when talking about the 
stuff that societies are made of.
Thesis: 
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is better, richer and more desirable for us human beings will constantly be found 
downstream, and the final goal, the sea, even if forever unattainable, will represent an 
ultimate value, that which gives meaning and purpose to time, history, and to us all.
The three interpretations mentioned this far all convey what I would like to call a 
heteronomous notion of history and time – that is, a notion of history as something given 
and immutable, its laws and properties given once and for all by nature, God, or whatever. 
Of course, this notion does not utterly exclude human influence on the events of history, 
which would be absurd. To a large extent however, it presents history as pre-determined 
by laws and conditions beyond human reach, laws and conditions that we have to accept 
and subordinate ourselves to.
The interpretation I favour is quite different, much less intuitive and not evocative of 
a river at all, or even streaming water. For me, the notion of being downstream, is consonant 
with being thrown into water that is already there – in puddles, canals, small lakes and 
swamps. In this marshland the water flows to and fro, currents are created, grow in 
strength, diverge, concord, diminish and disappear. Canals go dry, others overflow, puddles 
stagnate and evaporate, others are re-connected to the bigger lakes and so on. No direction 
is inscribed in this interpretation, no from where to there. In these marshes of history 
every position we may take or find ourselves in is always already downstream – in the 
sense that there is always water there before us, filled with toxic or nourishing particles and 
debris, the remains of earlier happenings in the marshes. Nor is there a difference in value 
implied by this interpretation – the different parts of our marshland are just different, 
other in relation to each other, more or less suitable for different purposes, nothing 
more.”3
Comment: Today is already downstream – and today I would consequently talk about 
magmas instead of marshes. What is essential is this: we need to address our history as 
present, and our future as a realm of possible interventions towards a future deliberately 
chosen. As in politics, each heteronomic inclination spells doom in the future. 
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Elucidation: ”Ensidic thinking” or ”ensidic logic” is a shorthand expression 
for the kind of thinking and logic that Cornelius Castoriadis calls ‘ensembliste-
identitaire’, that is thinking based on the idea that all aspects of being are specific 
differentiations of a determined original element, an element that should therefore 
be considered to be their unity, identity or essence.  Ensidic logic posits the origin 
of the laws of our world (natural laws as well as social ones) outside of our world 
and society. In this sense the ensidic thinking is heteronomous and tends to ‘cover 
over’ the fact that man is autonomous, whether he knows it or not. In short, ensidic 
logic rejects the possibility of gaps, play and indeterminacy in being – and thus of 
human creation. Needless to say, the tendency to think both science and politics in 
ensidic terms has been dominating Western thought ever since it was created. 
But, if we do not reckon with our ability to create new forms in and for our 
world, we would have to admit all kinds of oddities. For example, we would have to 
accept that everything that now is, from hairdryers and hot-dogs to symphonies 
and quantum-physics, is out of necessity and therefore, in a sense, has been there 
(where?) ever since the Big Bang (or what ever arche you choose). Or, if it is not 
always already there, we would at least have to assume that everything is fully 
explainable in casual terms – a position that Castoriadis calls ‘the myth of being as 
determined’. This mode of thinking may be summarised as follows:  Since the 
notion of universal causality and ‘the total rationality of what there is’ seems to be 
at odds with the way the world actually presents itself to us, and with the way we are 
in this world, we have to assign to causality and rationality its proper place and 
range – that is to the strata in the world that actually, inevitably and necessary are 
‘ruled’ by the ensidic-logic. But politics is not one of those strata – rather, it is the 
only domain where autonomy in the strong sense can realise itself. Consequently, 
when introduced in the sphere of politics, notions like ‘absolute necessity’, 
‘compelling reasons’ or ‘imperative rationality’ spell doom for autonomy.
In politics, exclusive faith in 
ensidic rationality spells 
doom.
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Comment: The pivotal word in this thesis is of course ‘exclusive’. I am not 
saying that we should do away with all attempts of planning our societies 
according to foresight, good reason, plans and projects. What I do claim is that 
we have to do away with the lingering belief in rational domination and control 
(the engineer way) in order to pave the way for a politics focusing on the ever 
fluctuating needs and openings of the present situation, as well as on the 
dependence on history and institutions; a situated politics not losing sight of 
global connections; a politics focusing on promoting what seems to be 
reasonable without mistaking firm conviction for evidence or universal 
validity – in short, a politics of the bricoleur. Or, if you prefer, a politics of 
autonomous, conscious creation. 
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Elucidation: “A general science of man, research bearing upon the genus homo, 
is therefore precisely this: research bearing upon the conditions and the forms of 
human creation.”4 This conclusion, formulated by Cornelius Castoriadis some ten 
years before his death, states in all its brevity the object and the predicament of our 
epistemological, and therefore also and inevitably political situation. To some, this 
may not seem as a radical or even as an important commitment. Creation is an 
everyday issue: Writing this, I am creating a text; reading these words you are 
creating a more or less coherent meaning by manipulating the signs which I have 
put together; mixing ingredients for your meal, you create a dish; contacting 
colleagues and strangers, you may make friends and enemies, and create networks; 
putting bricks upon bricks you create a statue or build a house etcetera. Nothing 
could be more common than activities of this kind, all so human. 
But human creativity is infinitely more complex than these ordinary activities 
may induce us to believe. The examples just mentioned are all instances of an 
individual intentionally creating something. But these cases are not, nor should 
they be taken as, paradigm cases of human creation. The most important and most 
insidious forms of human creation are not attributable or reducible to individual 
intentions, at least not in simple or obvious ways. Just reflect upon what it means to 
say that society, or our life-world, is a human construct or creation: Who intended 
it to become what it is? Who made the plans? Who is responsible? To my mind, the 
difficulties involved in trying to pin down individual intentions as the origin of the 
social, reveal these questions as being misdirected. 
Creation is inevitable 
and desirable.
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Comment: Creation occurs all the time, but not all creation is radical. For 
creation to be radical it has to be irreducible to what was there before. Most 
creations are not irreducible in this way – but some are. For instance, the 
creation of the social organisation that explicitly recognised itself as the origin 
of all its laws, traditions, rites and habits was such a creation – the creation of 
autonomous democracy. 
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Elucidation: The imaginary institution of society is the institution of society. 
Castoriadis explains: ” ‘That which’ creates society and history is the instituting 
society, as opposed to the instituted society. The instituting society is the social 
imaginary in the radical sense.”5 Our institutions are essential for keeping chaos and 
disintegration at bay, but they have a tendency to close themselves, establishing 
their specific ways of functioning as immutable laws – and thus presenting 
themselves as necessities and unalterable realities. This may be seen in the many 
different and multilayered ways in which religions and ideologies, mythologies and 
sciences have established themselves as True representations of the world. An 
essential political and conceptual task is to find ways to keep institutions from 
closing – an always specific and situated task.
Institutions are needed, but 
must inevitably and constantly 
be held open.
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Comment: “To put it bluntly: It is because there is radical imagination 
and instituting imaginary that there is any “reality” at all for us, and reality 
such as it is.”6 All kinds of institutionalised oblivion of this fact have to be 
thwarted. 
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Elucidation: Our knowledge and our truths are totally dependent upon 
ourselves as human beings and upon our versions of the world. We cannot claim to 
know anything in the sense of having direct access to the World, or the Forms/Ideas, 
or the Universe (and this would, of course, still be the case even if you believe in a 
God having created the world...). But we do know (in the doxic sense of doxa as 
opposed to episteme) a lot about the world we are living in. And we make our 
discriminations as to what is true and false, real and unreal etcetera according to 
what most of us take to be the dominant (scientific) doxa, which is the standard we 
tend to use when forced to chose between the true and the false. And every doxa is 
a human creation. We are, always in specific and changing ways way, forced to create 
our own facts, our own truths, our own possibilities – in a profoundly cosmogonic 
way we do create our world in doing politics, science, peace and war. And this is why 
we badly need to address the problems of creation, not only in relation to literature, 
poetry or art,  but in the very core of the scientific endeavour as well as in everyday 
politics. 
The creation of concepts 
equals the making of worlds 
– hence a political issue.
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Comment: We need to reflect upon what it means to know something in 
this context. That is, what are the conditions permitting us to know (as opposed 
to ‘to think’, ‘to guess’, ‘to presume’, ‘to fancy’ etc.) that, for example, a mythical 
account of the world is false? Well, the standards we use to separate true from 
false accounts, knowledge from fantasies, are the standards that are accepted in 
our community as the appropriate ones to use. And here I use the term 
‘community’ as shorthand for a more detailed description that would involve 
references to common sense, to disciplinary knowledge-formation and 
discourse – but above all to the prevailing doxa of a specific society/community/
discipline/culture. Moreover, what I call doxa is rather similar to what 
Castoriadis calls the magma of social imaginary significations of a society – 
keeping in mind that magma, for Castoriadis, also has an, as it were, ontological 
signification. The key issue here is to accept two things: First the obvious – if 
our standards were different, then the legitimate conclusions would also differ, 
and the knowledge and the truths of our world as well. Second, we need to 
admit– and from a traditional epistemological point of view this is probably a 
less palatable position – that our standards are by no means necessary or 
immutable; they are creations that could have been different, and that differ 
and defer all the time. 
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Elucidation: A political autonomy involves a conscious dealing with the 
creation of a human world. Castoriadis writes: “The self-institution of society is the 
creation of a human world: of ‘things’, ‘reality’, language, norms, values, ways of life 
and death, objects for which we live and objects for which we die – and of course 
first and foremost, the creation of the human individual in which the institution of 
society is massively embedded.”7  
Heteronomic societies, or politics, refuse autonomy and institute themselves, 
and their central significations, as unattainable and unchangeable for the society 
itself. They posit the origin of their laws outside of the society itself.
Autonomy is always preferable 
to heteronomy.
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Comment: There are two senses of autonomy – a biological and a social. 
Read in one way, they are opposites. Biological autonomy is neither chosen, 
nor conscious – it is just the way the world appears to a organism as a result of 
its biological makeup; sea-urchins deal with sea-urchin things, bats with bat 
things, and humans with human things. In this sense, every being is condemned 
to autonomy.
Social autonomy is quite a different matter, emerging (as far as we know) 
only in human societies, and only in a few of these. Castoriadis again: “As a 
germ, autonomy emerges when explicit and unlimited interrogation explodes 
on the scene – an interrogation that has bearing not on ‘facts’ but on the social 
imaginary significations and their possible grounding. This is a moment of 
creation, and it ushers a new type of society and a new type of individuals. I 
am speaking intentionally of a germ, for autonomy, social as well as individual, 
is a project. The rise of unlimited interrogation creates a new social-historical 
eidos: reflectiveness in the full sense, or self-reflectiveness, as well as the 
individual and the institutions which embody it. The questions raised are, on 
the social level: Are our laws good? Are they just? Which laws ought we to 
make? And, on the individual level: Is what I think true? Can I know if it is true 
– and if so, how?” 8 
Put in another way, biological autonomy is a precondition for social 
autonomy – just as embodiment is the precondition for the very existence of 
meaning of any kind.  That we humans to a large extent embody our world is, 
however, far from a sufficient condition for social autonomy to emerge – as a 
germ and project, autonomy is continously changing and needs to be ever 
renewed not to close in upon itself.
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Elucidation: Imaginary does not necessarily mean unreal. To be real is to have 
real effects in the world we live in. Reality is not something ‘out there’ but a complex 
web of relations, determinations and interconnections between subjects, history, 
creation, society etcetra. Castoriadis sums up the situation: “The ‘knowing subject’ 
is not and cannot be ego – and still less ego-logical. Language and understanding are 
social-historical creations, imaginary institutions that have to be imposed upon the 
singular psyche and permit the latter to make something of the debris of its 
prehuman ensidic organization. There is no ego-language any more than some 
mono-understanding; social-historical existence is an absolute condition for 
subjectivity. And subjectivity is far from being ‘simply logical’, even in its ‘logical’ 
and ‘knowing’ operation. There is a creative potential to the subject – to the singular 
subject – also in the domain of knowledge, which is source of innovation. In altering 
its knowledge – the social-historical knowledge each time established – the subject 
does not ‘adapt’ itself; it posits new thinkable figures of Being/being as knowable and 
thinkable. And this it can do only because it is also and especially radical imagination, 
a virtually communicable – figurable and sayable – presentational potentiality. It 
could not do this through ‘reason’ or ‘understanding’. The one and the other can 
contrive and corroborate, systematize or deduce – neither the one nor the other can 
posit anything that is new and has a content. But without language, without 
understanding, without reference to ‘reality’ and even to the tradition of research, 
this imaginary would produce only phantasms; with them and through them it can 
create knowledge.”9 
Social imaginary institutions are 
(of course) real and efficient.
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Comment: Castoriadis’s position is thus not a relativism in the received 
sense, but nor is it an objectivism. It articulates a position that encompasses 
the traditional epistemological and theoretical stances, transforms them and 
turns them into something else – into, if you permit, a magmatic approach to 
knowing and reality. 
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Elucidation: 
An intervention has to intervene in the 
magma of social imaginary 
significations, or not intervene at all.
Thesis: 
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Comment: This thesis states an ambiguous evidence, that may be explored 
in a multitude of directions. There is no guarantee that an intervention is good, 
desirable, sensible or leading to a better state of things – in fact, most passionate 
or coldly calculated interventions do not, as we know far to well.
But we have no alternative – either we try to grasp our autonomy and inter-
vene as best we can, or fall prey to heteronomic actions and thinking of all 
kinds. There is hope in the fact that no-one can have absolute control. Or, put 
in another way, if God really existed, all hope would be gone.
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Notes
1. Castoriadis (1977: 509)
2. Cf. Fragm. # 12, 49a, and 91.
3. Mats Rosengren (2005:203-205) 
4. Cornelius Castoriadis (1997c: 104) ”Anthropology, philosophy, Politics”; 
translation David Ames Curtis; in Thesis Eleven; May 1997; p. 117-135; page 
104. 
5. Castoriadis (1997b: 269) 
6. Castoriadis (1997a: 228) The translation is my own. 
7. Cornelius Castoriadis (1997b: 269)  
8. Castoriadis (1991: 163) 
9. Cornelius Castoriadis (1997b: 372-373) 
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